In this module
AD2.4 Anti-Phishing Policies Beyond Defaults
Figure AD2.4 — Spoof detection catches forged sender domains. Impersonation protection catches attackers who use legitimate email services but impersonate your executives or trusted domains by display name. The BEC attacks that cause the most financial damage use impersonation, not spoofing — which is why impersonation protection is essential.
Building the anti-phishing policy
Navigate to security.microsoft.com → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Anti-phishing. Click "Create" to build a new policy.
Name: "Anti-phishing — Impersonation Protection"
Users and domains: Include → All recipients.
Phishing threshold: Set to 2 — Aggressive. The default is 1 (Standard). Level 2 increases detection sensitivity for impersonation attempts. Level 3 (More aggressive) and Level 4 (Most aggressive) increase false positives significantly — start at 2 and increase only if you're still seeing impersonation attempts getting through.
Impersonation — Users to protect: Enable user impersonation protection and add your high-value targets. At minimum, add your CEO, CFO, finance director, and any senior leader whose name could be used to authorize payments or request sensitive data. You can protect up to 350 users. Add them with both their display name and email address:
- James Morrison — j.morrison@northgateeng.com
- Sarah Chen — s.chen@northgateeng.com (CFO)
- The managing director, HR director, and IT director
When an email arrives with a display name that closely matches one of these protected users but comes from a non-company domain, the policy triggers.
Impersonation — Domains to protect: Enable domain impersonation protection. Add your primary domain (northgateeng.com) and any domains you frequently receive email from — key vendors, partners, banks, and legal firms. Domain impersonation catches lookalike domains: northgateeng.co, northgate-eng.com, northgateengineering.com.
Mailbox intelligence: Enable this. Mailbox intelligence uses machine learning to learn each user's normal communication patterns — who they email, how often, and the typical content. When an email arrives that claims to be from a regular contact but doesn't match the established pattern, mailbox intelligence flags it. This catches impersonation attempts that use the correct display name and a plausible domain but haven't previously communicated with the target user.
Actions — If a message is detected as user impersonation: Set to "Quarantine the message." Don't set it to "Move to Junk" — BEC emails in the Junk folder can still be opened by users who check their Junk folder regularly. Quarantine keeps the message out of the user's mailbox entirely, and you can release it if it's a false positive.
Actions — If a message is detected as domain impersonation: Set to "Quarantine the message."
Safety tips: Enable all safety tips:
- First contact safety tip: Shows a banner on emails from senders the user has never communicated with before. This is particularly effective for BEC — when the "CEO" emails the finance clerk for the first time, the banner flags it.
- User impersonation safety tip: Shows when the sender's display name matches a protected user but the email address doesn't match.
- Domain impersonation safety tip: Shows when the sender domain is similar to a protected domain.
- Unusual characters safety tip: Shows when the sender address contains unusual characters that might be used for visual spoofing.
Click "Submit" to create the policy.
Handling false positives
Impersonation protection generates more false positives than Safe Links or Safe Attachments because it's matching patterns rather than scanning content. The most common false positive: a protected user has a personal email account with the same display name (e.g., the CEO sends an email from their personal Gmail to a colleague — the display name matches the protected user, but the domain is Gmail, so impersonation protection triggers).
When a user reports a quarantined email that's legitimate, release it from quarantine and add the sender to the "Trusted senders and domains" list in the anti-phishing policy. Navigate to the policy → Trusted senders → add the specific email address (not the entire domain — adding gmail.com as a trusted domain would defeat the purpose).
Track false positives for the first two weeks after deployment. If a specific protected user generates frequent false positives because they communicate from personal addresses, add those personal addresses to the trusted senders list. After the initial tuning period (typically 2-3 weeks), false positives should be rare.
Verifying your anti-phishing configuration
After creating the policy, verify it's active and configured correctly with PowerShell:
Connect-ExchangeOnline
Get-AntiPhishPolicy | Select-Object Name, Enabled, PhishThresholdLevel,
EnableTargetedUserProtection, EnableTargetedDomainsProtection,
EnableMailboxIntelligence, TargetedUserProtectionAction,
TargetedDomainProtectionAction | Format-ListCheck that EnableTargetedUserProtection and EnableTargetedDomainsProtection are both True, PhishThresholdLevel is 2, and the actions are set to Quarantine. If any setting is wrong, update it:
Set-AntiPhishPolicy -Identity "Anti-phishing — Impersonation Protection" `
-PhishThresholdLevel 2 `
-EnableTargetedUserProtection $true `
-TargetedUserProtectionAction QuarantineTo see your protected users list:
Get-AntiPhishPolicy -Identity "Anti-phishing — Impersonation Protection" |
Select-Object -ExpandProperty TargetedUsersToProtectThis returns the list of users you configured for impersonation protection. Verify your CEO, CFO, and other executives are on the list. If someone is missing, add them:
$currentUsers = (Get-AntiPhishPolicy -Identity "Anti-phishing — Impersonation Protection").TargetedUsersToProtect
$currentUsers += "New User;newuser@northgateeng.com"
Set-AntiPhishPolicy -Identity "Anti-phishing — Impersonation Protection" -TargetedUsersToProtect $currentUsersReview this list quarterly — executive turnover, promotions, and new hires change who should be protected. A departing CFO no longer needs impersonation protection, but the new CFO does. Add VIP list review to the quarterly security report cadence (AD7.5).
Spoof intelligence tuning
Beyond impersonation protection, Defender for Office 365 includes spoof intelligence — the ability to detect and handle emails where the sender domain doesn't match the actual sending infrastructure. Navigate to security.microsoft.com → Email & collaboration → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Anti-phishing → Spoof intelligence.
The spoof intelligence page shows senders that have been detected spoofing domains — both your domain and external domains. Each entry shows: the spoofed domain, the sending infrastructure, the volume of messages, and whether you've allowed or blocked the spoofing.
Review this page during initial deployment. You'll likely see legitimate entries — third-party services that send email on behalf of your domain (marketing platforms, CRM systems, helpdesk ticketing systems). These are "allowed to spoof" because they're authorized senders. You'll also see illegitimate entries — unknown infrastructure sending as your domain. These should be "not allowed to spoof."
The spoof intelligence feed is self-learning. Microsoft pre-populates it based on observed traffic patterns. Your job is to review it, confirm the "allowed" entries are genuinely legitimate, and ensure "not allowed" entries are actually blocked. Do this review once at deployment and then quarterly.
Your anti-phishing policy has been active for one week. The finance team reports that 3 emails from a legitimate vendor (their bank's relationship manager) were quarantined as "user impersonation" because the bank manager's name matches the name of your CFO. The emails contained legitimate payment confirmations. What do you do?
Option A: Lower the phishing threshold from 2 to 1 to reduce false positives.
Option B: Add the bank manager's specific email address to the trusted senders list in the anti-phishing policy.
Option C: Disable user impersonation protection for the CFO.
The correct answer is Option B. Lowering the threshold reduces protection across the board — affecting all protected users, not just this one false positive. Disabling protection for the CFO removes the control from the highest-value target. Adding the specific sender to the trusted list resolves the false positive without reducing protection for anyone else. The bank manager's address is a known legitimate sender — trusting it is a targeted, documented exception.
Try it: Configure impersonation protection
Navigate to security.microsoft.com → Policies & rules → Threat policies → Anti-phishing. Create the policy with the settings in this subsection.
For the "Users to protect" list, add at least your CEO and CFO (or equivalent senior leaders). For "Domains to protect," add your primary domain and your top 3 vendor/partner domains.
After the policy is active (15-30 minutes propagation), test it: send an email from a personal Gmail or Outlook.com account to a colleague, using a display name that matches one of your protected users. The email should be quarantined (or show a safety tip if you set the action to "Add a tag" for testing). If it passes through without any flag, check the policy scope and the phishing threshold setting.
Review the quarantine after a few days of the policy being active: security.microsoft.com → Email & collaboration → Review → Quarantine. Filter by "Quarantine reason: Phish." Are the quarantined emails genuine impersonation attempts or false positives? Release any false positives and add the senders to the trusted list.
Testing impersonation detection before full deployment
Before expanding the policy to all users, test it with your own account. Create a test by sending yourself an email from a personal Gmail or Outlook.com account where you set the display name to match one of your protected users (your own name works for this test).
Check what happens: Does the email arrive normally, go to junk, or get quarantined? Check the message headers for the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AuthAs and X-Forefront-Antispam-Report headers — these show whether the anti-phishing policy evaluated the email and what action was taken. If the email arrives without any impersonation flag, the policy may not be applied to your account — verify the policy scope includes your recipient address.
Navigate to security.microsoft.com → Email & collaboration → Explorer (if available) or the quarantine to see the detection details. The quarantine entry shows the specific reason for quarantine: "User impersonation" (display name matched), "Domain impersonation" (lookalike domain detected), or "Mailbox intelligence" (unusual sender pattern). This information helps you understand what the policy catches and at what sensitivity level.
For ongoing monitoring, run a weekly check of impersonation detections:
# Check quarantine for impersonation detections in the last 7 days
Get-QuarantineMessage -QuarantineTypes "HighConfPhish","Phish" -StartDate (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) |
Where-Object { $_.QuarantineTypes -like "*Impersonation*" -or $_.PolicyName -like "*Anti-phish*" } |
Select-Object ReceivedTime, SenderAddress, Subject, QuarantineTypes |
Format-Table -AutoSizeThis shows you every email quarantined by your anti-phishing policy in the last week — both true positives (BEC attempts) and false positives (legitimate emails from senders whose names match your protected users). Review each one: release false positives and add the sender to trusted senders. Leave true positives quarantined and block the sender domain if you see repeated attempts.
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