13.15 Module Assessment

2–3 hours · Module 13

Module Assessment

You have completed a full AiTM credential phishing investigation — from first alert to lessons learned. This assessment tests your understanding across the entire investigation lifecycle.

Module 13 — Key takeaways

  • AiTM phishing captures session tokens after MFA completion — MFA alone does not stop it
  • Token replay appears in AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs, not SigninLogs — always check both tables
  • The anti-join pattern (non-interactive IPs not in interactive baseline) is the primary token replay detection
  • Containment sequence: revoke sessions, reset password, force MFA re-registration, remove persistence, verify, contact user by phone
  • Post-compromise checklist: inbox rules, forwarding, OAuth grants, email access (MailItemsAccessed), file access, lateral phishing
  • Phishing kit URL patterns are more durable IOCs than individual domains
  • Detection maturity should progress from reactive to preventive across waves of a campaign
  • Require compliant device is the fastest AiTM countermeasure to deploy; FIDO2 is the most comprehensive
  • CISO reports answer 5 questions: what happened, impact, actions, current status, recommendations
  • Lessons learned must include specific improvement actions with owners and deadlines
  • Known security gaps that are not remediated are accepted risks — make sure someone is explicitly accepting them

Module 13 — Final assessment (15 questions)

1. What is the fundamental mechanism that allows AiTM to defeat MFA?

AiTM disables MFA
AiTM brute-forces the MFA code
AiTM proxies the entire authentication flow and captures the session token after MFA is legitimately completed by the user

2. Which KQL table is the primary source for detecting token replay?

SigninLogs
AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
SecurityAlert

3. What is the first containment action when token replay is confirmed?

Revoke all sessions — this invalidates the stolen token immediately
Reset the password
Remove inbox rules

4. The phishing URL was clean at delivery but flagged 23 minutes later. Why?

The phishing kit used a Cloudflare turnstile CAPTCHA that blocked automated URL scanners. Only human visitors reached the proxy. The URL was reclassified when Microsoft threat intelligence updated.
The URL was not yet active at delivery
Safe Links was disabled

5. Why is the URL path pattern /auth/[hash]/login more valuable than the phishing domain as an IOC?

Domains are always the same
URL paths are longer
Domains are disposable and change per wave. The URL path is generated by the phishing kit code and remains consistent across all domains — it identifies the kit, not the infrastructure.

6. Which conditional access policy would have prevented the entire attack?

Require MFA for all users
Require compliant device — the attacker's unmanaged device fails compliance regardless of the token's MFA claim
Block sign-ins from Nigeria

7. What is the purpose of checking OAuth grants during post-compromise analysis?

OAuth grants persist beyond session revocation and password reset. A malicious app with mailbox permissions retains access independently of the user's authentication state.
OAuth grants are always malicious
Microsoft requires it

8. The attacker read 34 financial emails. What type of follow-on attack were they preparing?

Business email compromise — gathering intelligence on payment processes, vendor names, and invoice formats to craft a convincing financial fraud email
Ransomware deployment
Data sale on the dark web

9. Why contact the user by phone rather than email after containment?

Email is too slow
The user might ignore an email
The attacker had mailbox access. If forwarding exists you missed, or if the inbox rule is still processing, an email notification could be intercepted. Phone is the only channel the attacker cannot compromise.

10. Detection improved from 23 minutes (Wave 1) to pre-delivery blocking (Waves 4-5). What drove this progression?

Microsoft automatically updated their detections
Each wave produced IOCs and patterns that were converted into progressively faster detections: ZAP (reactive) to NRT rule (near-real-time) to transport rule (preventive block)
Users stopped clicking

11. FIDO2 stops AiTM but authenticator app push does not. What is the fundamental difference?

FIDO2 is hardware-based
FIDO2 uses biometrics
FIDO2 cryptographically verifies the server domain — a proxy on a different domain cannot complete the handshake. Authenticator push has no domain verification.

12. In the CISO report, why must recommendations include effort and timeline in addition to priority?

A recommendation without effort is a wish list. The CISO needs to know what can be done in a week vs what requires a 6-month project, and what costs £0 (config change) vs £40,000 (hardware for all users).
It makes the report longer
Auditors require it

13. The device compliance policy was on the security roadmap for 6 months but was not implemented. What is the organisational lesson?

The security team was understaffed
The policy was not important enough
Known gaps that are not remediated are accepted risks. Someone should be explicitly accepting them. A process requiring risk acceptance sign-off for overdue roadmap items creates accountability.

14. You find successful non-interactive sign-ins from the attacker IP 20 minutes after revoking all sessions. What is the most likely cause?

Token revocation takes 20 minutes
The query is delayed
A persistence mechanism was missed — likely an OAuth grant, a delegate mailbox permission, or a second compromised account. Escalate immediately and expand scope.

15. What should every investigation produce at minimum, beyond the incident report?

At least one new detection rule — converting the investigation's IOCs and patterns into automated detection that catches the same attack pattern in the future
A blog post
A penetration test