13.14 Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
The formal post-incident review. Every incident should produce a lessons learned document that answers: what went well, what could be improved, and what specific actions will be taken.
What went well
- Detection time: 23 minutes from email delivery to first alert (ZAP verdict change). Within expected parameters for a novel AiTM URL.
- Containment time: 8 minutes from triage start to full containment. Pre-built investigation queries and a clear playbook enabled rapid response.
- Campaign tracking: Detection maturity improved from reactive (Wave 1) to preventive (Waves 4-5) within 48 hours.
- Zero successful replays in Waves 2-5. Each wave was detected and contained before any credential replay occurred.
- Cross-product correlation: Defender XDR correctly correlated the phishing email alert with the suspicious sign-in alert into a single incident.
What could be improved
- 23-minute detection gap. ZAP removed the email from 4 mailboxes, but 19 were accessible for 23 minutes. During this window, 7 users clicked and 5 reached the proxy page. Faster URL detonation or Safe Links block mode (instead of warn mode) would reduce this window.
- No device compliance requirement. The conditional access gap that allowed the token replay was known but not addressed before the incident. The gap existed for 6 months on the security roadmap without implementation.
- MFA method. Authenticator app push is vulnerable to AiTM. FIDO2 deployment had been deprioritised due to hardware cost.
- User behaviour. 5 of 7 users who saw the Safe Links warning clicked through anyway. Security awareness training on Safe Links warnings was not part of the regular training programme.
Improvement actions
| Action | Owner | Deadline | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deploy device compliance CA policy for Exchange/SharePoint | Security team | Deployed during incident | Complete |
| Block legacy authentication | Security team | Deployed during incident | Complete |
| FIDO2 Phase 1 (admins) | IT + Security | 2 weeks | In progress |
| FIDO2 Phase 2 (executives + finance) | IT + Security | 6 weeks | Procurement |
| Safe Links: evaluate block mode vs warn mode | Security team | 4 weeks | Planned |
| Targeted phishing awareness training (finance) | HR + Security | 4 weeks | Planned |
| Quarterly phishing simulation programme | Security team | 8 weeks | Planned |
| Review and close all overdue security roadmap items | CISO | 2 weeks | Planned |
The conditional access gap that allowed this attack was known for 6 months. It was on the security roadmap. It was not implemented because it was not prioritised. This incident cost 40+ hours of analyst time, a regulatory assessment, management reporting, and emergency hardware procurement. The configuration change took 15 minutes. Known gaps that are not remediated are not gaps — they are accepted risks. Make sure someone is explicitly accepting them.
Check your understanding
1. The device compliance policy had been on the security roadmap for 6 months but was not implemented. What organisational change would prevent this from happening again?