13.9 Waves 2-5: Campaign Tracking
Waves 2-5: The Campaign Continues
Containing Wave 1 does not end the incident. The attacker has infrastructure, a target list, and proof that their kit works. They will try again with different lures.
Wave 2 — Day 1, 21:00 GMT (12 hours after Wave 1)
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Result: 41 emails from northgate-docs[.]com with subject “Shared document: Q4 Budget Review.” Different domain, different lure, all-staff targeting. 38 delivered, 3 blocked. The URL path pattern matches Wave 1: /auth/[hash]/login.
Detection improvement per wave
| Wave | Domain | Lure | Delivered | Detected by | Time to detect |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | northgate-voicemail[.]com | Voicemail notification | 19/23 | ZAP (post-delivery) | 23 minutes |
| 2 | northgate-docs[.]com | Document sharing | 38/41 | Manual hunt (pattern match) | 2 hours |
| 3 | northgateeng-support[.]com | IT password reset | 5/8 | NRT analytics rule | 4 minutes |
| 4 | northgate-benefits[.]com | Benefits enrolment | 11/15 | Transport rule (blocked) | 0 (pre-delivery) |
| 5 | northgate-projects[.]com | Project update | 8/31 | Transport rule (blocked) | 0 (pre-delivery) |
Wave 1: reactive (ZAP, 23 minutes). Wave 2: proactive hunt (pattern match, 2 hours). Wave 3: automated detection (NRT rule, 4 minutes). Waves 4-5: preventive (transport rule, blocked before delivery). This progression from reactive to preventive is the goal of every IR engagement.
Wave 3 — Executive targeting
Wave 3 targeted 8 executives with an IT password reset lure. The NRT analytics rule deployed after Wave 2 caught it within 4 minutes. No executives clicked. Two factors: executives tend to have better security awareness training, and the “IT support” lure was less convincing than the voicemail lure (executives do not expect IT to email them password reset links).
Waves 4-5 — Blocked by transport rules
After Wave 3, Exchange Online transport rules were deployed blocking the URL path pattern /auth/[a-f0-9]{32}/login across all inbound email. Waves 4 and 5 were mostly blocked at delivery. The 8 and 11 that delivered used slightly modified URL structures — the attacker began adapting. But by this point, the pattern was well-understood and additional rules were deployed within hours.
Try it yourself
Recommended approach: Quarantine rather than block for the first 24 hours. This allows you to review quarantined emails for false positives before switching to a hard block. The regex pattern /auth/[a-f0-9]{32}/login is specific enough that false positives are unlikely, but quarantine-first is the safer approach for production environments.
After 24 hours with zero false positives in quarantine, switch to hard block (reject with NDR). Add specific domain blocks for each identified phishing domain as a belt-and-braces measure.
Check your understanding
1. Detection improved from 23 minutes (Wave 1) to 0 minutes (Waves 4-5). What drove this improvement?