7.2 Sensor and Client Configuration
Sensor and Client Configuration
By the end of this subsection, you will know the critical sensor settings that affect detection quality, understand cloud protection levels, configure tamper protection, and troubleshoot common onboarding failures.
Onboarding installs the sensor. Configuration determines what it detects and how it responds. Default settings are reasonable for most environments, but several settings significantly affect detection quality and should be explicitly verified.
Critical settings to verify
| Setting | Default | Recommended | Impact of incorrect setting |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cloud-delivered protection | Enabled | Enabled | Disabling removes 80%+ of malware detection. The cloud intelligence network identifies new threats within seconds — local signatures alone are days behind. |
| Cloud protection level | Default | High+ or Zero tolerance | Higher levels block more aggressively. “Default” allows some suspicious files that “High+” would quarantine. “Zero tolerance” blocks anything not in the known-safe list. |
| Sample submission | Send safe samples | Send all samples | “Safe samples only” means Microsoft never sees the truly suspicious files. “Send all” enables full cloud analysis of every unknown file. |
| Tamper protection | Varies (verify!) | Enabled | Without tamper protection, any local admin can disable Defender with one PowerShell command. The attacker’s first action after gaining admin access. |
| Block at first sight (BAFS) | Enabled | Enabled | Holds unrecognized files for up to 10 seconds while cloud analysis runs. Catches zero-day malware that signature-based scanning misses. |
| PUA protection | Audit | Enabled (block) | Potentially Unwanted Applications (adware, toolbars, cryptominers) are blocked instead of just logged. |
| Network protection | Disabled | Enabled (block) | Blocks connections to known malicious domains/IPs. Without it, C2 communication succeeds even though the domain is in Microsoft threat intel. |
In many environments, tamper protection was disabled because an admin needed to make a configuration change and never re-enabled it. Without it, an attacker with local admin access runs: Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true — Defender stops protecting the device instantly. The attacker then executes their payload with zero endpoint detection. Verify tamper protection on every device, on every audit.
Verifying configuration at scale
| |
| ConfigName | Compliant | NonCompliant | CompliancePercent |
|---|---|---|---|
| Network protection | 312 | 177 | 63.8% |
| Tamper protection | 471 | 18 | 96.3% |
| Cloud protection | 487 | 2 | 99.6% |
| Real-time protection | 489 | 0 | 100% |
| PUA protection | 445 | 44 | 91.0% |
Troubleshooting onboarding failures
| Symptom | Diagnosis | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| Device does not appear in DeviceInfo after 24 hours | Onboarding failed or device has not synced | Check Event Viewer → Applications and Services Logs → Microsoft → Windows → SENSE. Look for error events. Re-run onboarding with /troubleshoot flag. |
| “Onboarded” but SensorHealthState = “Inactive” | Sensor cannot reach Defender cloud services | Verify network connectivity: device must reach *.securitycenter.windows.com, *.security.microsoft.com on port 443. Check proxy configuration. Run mdatp health on the device. |
| Sensor running but zero alerts generated | Cloud protection or real-time protection disabled | Run the configuration compliance query above. Deploy Intune policy to enforce settings. |
| macOS shows onboarded but no process events | System Extension not approved | Deploy PPPC profile via Intune/Jamf that pre-approves Microsoft Defender System Extension. |
| Linux shows onboarded but limited telemetry | SELinux or AppArmor blocking | Check mdatp health --field real_time_protection_enabled. Adjust SELinux/AppArmor policies for the Defender process. |
Try it yourself
The most commonly non-compliant setting is network protection — it is disabled by default and many organizations have not enabled it. To fix: create an Intune Endpoint Security profile (Attack Surface Reduction → Network protection → Enabled in block mode) targeting all Windows devices. This blocks connections to known-malicious domains using Microsoft threat intelligence.
For tamper protection: this is enabled via the Microsoft Defender for Endpoint portal (Settings → Advanced features → Tamper protection → On), not via Intune. It applies tenant-wide once enabled.
Check your understanding
1. An attacker gains local admin on a workstation. Tamper protection is disabled. What is their first action?
2. Network protection is disabled on 177 devices. What is the security impact?